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This paper presents a moral hazard model of ﬁnancing in which borrowers
adopt two modes of ﬁnance, either issuing bonds or applying for bank loans.
The bond rate is set by the borrowers, while the loan rate is chosen by a monop-
olistic bank. Bank ﬁnance ameliorates the moral hazard problem by monitoring
borrowers. Monetary interventions, which aﬀect real economy through the bank
lending channel, are justiﬁed on the basis of welfare considerations. When the
informational problem is not severe, monitoring is wasteful and welfare is en-
hanced through a monetary tightening. When the moral hazard problem is
severe, monitoring is useful and welfare is increased by a monetary expansion.
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11 Introduction
There are two views of the initial impact of monetary policy on ﬁnancial markets:
money and credit view.1 The ﬁrst one is the traditional IS/LM textbook description
where (i) loans, the bank assets, are considered perfect substitutes for other debt
instruments and then lumped together with these in a general bond market, (ii)
authorities can directly control the quantity of money by adjusting reserves. Ac-
cordingly, when authorities reduce the level of reserves, the availability of money
(i.e., bank liability) decreases; banks passively suﬀer the consequent reduction of as-
sets (bonds) and relative repayment increases: investment and aggregate production
are negatively aﬀected. Money (deposits) is then the only mean of the monetary
policy transmission.
The credit view refuses the ﬁrst hypothesis by stressing the importance of asym-
metric information in credit markets, on the ground of which loans and bonds are
considered to be imperfect substitutes both for borrowers and for banks. We focus
our attention on a particular strand of the credit channel literature, called bank
lending channel, which assumes that a monetary tightening produces reduction in
the supply of loans. Equilibrium of the lending market then plays a central role
in how monetary policy aﬀects aggregate production. Empirical works show strong
evidence in favor of a high correlation between monetary intervention and supply of
loans: Kashyap et al. (1993) ﬁnd that a restrictive policy is followed by a raise in
commercial paper issuance and a decline in bank loans. Many theoretical works give
a formalization of how the credit channel operates. Two types of them may be found
in the literature: papers à la Bernanke and Blinder (1988) in which a general equi-
librium framework is proposed, but ﬁnancial choices of agents are not derived from
ﬁrst principles, and models à la Repullo and Suarez (2000) or Holmstrom and Tirole
(1997), in which choices are micro-founded, but in a partial equilibrium framework
where monetary authorities are not explicitly modeled and are assumed to target
directly an endogenous interest rate. Nevertheless, no paper seems to consider the
problem of why authorities intervene: eﬀects of monetary policies are studied in
economies where equilibrium level of welfare is constrained eﬃcient. In contrast,
the current paper assumes that the bank lending channel is in action and focuses
on constructing a partial equilibrium model in which equilibria arise with ineﬃcient
levels of aggregate production: monetary intervention is addressed to reduce such
an ineﬃciency.
1See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a survey.
2More exactly, a moral hazard framework of ﬁnancing (Holmstrom and Tirole,
1997) is proposed, where homogeneous borrowers need money to implement a project.
The borrowers raise funds either by issuing bonds or by applying for bank loans.
After the ﬁnancial contract is signed, they can choose between two levels of eﬀort:
when choosing the low one they obtain a private beneﬁt, but the project is eﬃcient
when eﬀort is high. Private beneﬁts are nonmonetary and nontransferable quantities
through which the borrowers embezzle resources from the projects. Lenders cannot
verify the choice of the eﬀort. The borrowers’ participation constraint is always sat-
isﬁed in equilibrium, so that the demand for credit is equal to the amount of savings
that can be lent.
A household sector is introduced that buys bonds and deposits money in the
bank sector. Households’ total savings are assumed to be equal to the demand for
credit, hence all the borrowers obtain funding. Loans are supplied by a monopolistic
bank, which has no initial capital and raises funds by insured deposits. We limit
assets and liabilities of the bank respectively to loans and deposits relying on the
idea, behind the bank lending view, that loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes
for the bank and that insured deposits are the cheapest way of ﬁnancing loans
(Stein, 1998), hence the correlation between availability of deposits and supply of
bank loans is high. We assume for simplicity that after a tightening that reduces
loans, our homogeneous borrowers can shift to bond ﬁnancing. In other words, a
monetary intervention does not modify the quantity of credit, rather aﬀecting the
composition of lending.
We argue that the bank can better monitor the borrowers than the dispersed
households. A free-riding argument can enforce the assumption: each household
is small, so it is not worth paying the monitoring cost because everybody would
like someone else to bear the cost (Allen and Gale, 2000). The dispersion of the
households can also generate wasteful multiplication of monitoring costs (Diamond,
1984). Monitoring ameliorates the moral hazard problem, by reducing private bene-
ﬁts to the borrowers. The bank decides to monitor in equilibrium and to induce the
borrowers to choose high eﬀort. Moreover, by taking into account the empirical evi-
dence that bank credit is more expensive than direct debt (James, 1987), we assume
that borrowers’ proﬁts on bonds are higher than proﬁts on loans for any admissible
value of the bond rate.
We deﬁne as welfare the sum of proﬁts of all agents and we assume that monetary
authorities act directly on the bond rate to maximize welfare. The assumption is
related to the idea that, following a monetary operation which targets the T-bills
3interest rate, eﬀects on the bond repayment are less delayed and less ambiguous than
eﬀects on the loan rate and it is also due to the diﬃculties involved in constructing
a congruous model of a monetary economy. Changes in the bond rate aﬀect the
allocation of savings between bonds and deposits. When remuneration on bonds
rises less borrowers are ﬁnanced by loans because the supply of deposits decreases.
When the opposite holds, more borrowers are ﬁnanced by loans because the supply
of deposits increases.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that after a tightening external ﬁnancing of
large ﬁrms increases and that it is the small ﬁrms that experience a large decreases
in bank loans, which are essentially their only source of ﬁnancing. Even if no ex-
ogenous heterogeneity of the borrowers is taken into account, the model gives a
normative interpretation to evidence on the cross-sectional impact of monetary pol-
icy by studying how the equilibrium bond repayment changes with the severity of
the moral hazard problem. Such a severity is deﬁned as follows: the bigger are pri-
vate beneﬁts, the higher is the incentive for the borrowers to choose the ineﬃcient
project and the harder the moral hazard problem will be. The size of private beneﬁts
may depend on how the legal system works: if it works well the borrowers cannot
easily manipulate balance-sheets, whereas if it works badly, the borrowers can take
signiﬁcant amounts of money from the project.
Indeed, when moral hazard is weak for private beneﬁts are low, the equilibrium
bond repayment is such that the borrowers choose high eﬀort. In this case monitoring
is wasteful because the borrowers behave well even if they are not monitored, hence
a monetary tightening is justiﬁed by the need of reducing deposits and thereby the
supply of loans. In other words, low private beneﬁts depict a situation where the pool
of borrowers is good: in such a case a tightening is addressed to increase the access to
direct debt. We show that it is welfare-enhancing for bonds are more eﬃcient. When
moral hazard is severe the equilibrium bond rate induces the borrowers to choose low
eﬀort, hence bond ﬁnance represents the inferior mode. Nonetheless monitoring is
costly, hence authorities reduce the targeted rate to induce the borrowers to behave
well under bond ﬁnance. In other words, when private beneﬁts are high the pool of
borrowers is bad; a reduction of the bond rate augments their stake in the project
and induces them to increase the eﬀort.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 studies equilibria with weak and severe moral hazard. Section 4 analy-
ses the eﬃciency of equilibria and explains how monetary authorities can increase
welfare. Section 5 contains concluding notes.
42 The model
Borrowers. Consider n risk neutral and homogeneous borrowers, with n arbitrarily
large, each of whom needs one unit of capital to implement a project. Each project
yields A with probability pi and zero otherwise. Let i = s,r and ps > pr: the
borrowers may decide to reduce the probability of success (or, say, the eﬀort level)
from ps to pr in order to enjoy private beneﬁts equal to B > 0. Let s be the project
when the borrowers choose ps and r the project when pr is chosen. The borrowers
have two alternatives of ﬁnancing: they can either issue bonds or apply for bank
loans. The choice of the project is made after the ﬁnancial contract is signed and it
is not veriﬁable by lenders.
Households and Monopolistic Bank. Consider m risk neutral and homogeneous
households, with m arbitrarily large, each of whom endowed with an amount of
savings equal to n
m and to be allocated between bonds and bank deposits. Bonds
and deposits are not perfect substitutes: the households need deposits in order to
perform daily transactions; on the contrary, bonds cannot oﬀer this service (Bolton
and Freixas, 2000). Let D be the deposit remuneration set by a monopolistic bank
and piF be the unitary return of each household on bonds, where F is the bond





piF for any D < piF
n for any D ≥ piF
(1)
When D < piF deposits are less remunerative, however the households allocate some
savings to deposits. When D ≥ piF deposits have at least the same remuneration
as bonds and the households allocate all savings to the former.
The bank has no initial capital and it can raise funds only by deposits. Deposits
are insured, so that if the bank fails an outside insurance fund repays households.
The cost of deposit insurance is ﬁxed and, without loss of generality, normalized to
zero. For the sake of simplicity the bank is assumed to lend all deposits it raises,
therefore its loanable funds are given by nλ(D,F).2
Monitoring and Contracts. The households are dispersed, so that they cannot
monitor the eﬀort level chosen by the borrowers. The bank can instead monitor
the eﬀort at a unitary cost c > 0. When the bank monitors private beneﬁts of the
borrowers diminish to b > 0.
2The demand for bonds is equal to n(1 − λ(D,F)).
5Assumption 1 c <
prps
(ps−pr)2b and B ≤ B < B, where B =
ps
ps−prb and B =
(ps − pr)A − c.3
Assumption 1 states that monitoring is both suﬃciently cheap and suﬃciently
eﬃcient and implies psA > prA + B: throughout the paper we refer to project s as
the eﬃcient project and to project r as the ineﬃcient project. Both bank loans and
bonds take the following contractual form: when the project succeeds the borrowers
repay a gross interest rate which must not exceed A, whereas in the case of failure
no repayment is made. The upper bound on the repayment derives from the fact
that private beneﬁts are assumed not to be transferable: lenders can at most obtain
the monetary outcome of the project. Proﬁt of the bank amounts to4
nλ(D,F)(piR − cj − D). (2)
where R is the loan repayment set by the bank, cj = c if monitoring is implemented
and cj = 0 otherwise. Remark that λ(D,F) and 1 − λ(D,F) can be interpreted
as the ex ante probabilities that each borrower receives money either from the bank













c (R) = pi (A − R)+bi, bs = 0 and br = b, Ui
0 (R) = pi (A − R)+Bi, Bs = 0
and Br = B, Ui (F) = pi (A − F) + Bi. Finally, unitary proﬁt of each household is
λ(D,F)D + (1 − λ(D,F))piF. (4)
Welfare is deﬁned as the sum of proﬁts of bank, borrowers and households:
W =
￿
n[λ(piA + bi − c) + (1 − λ)(piA + Bi)] if monitoring is implemented
n[λ(piA + Bi) + (1 − λ)(piA + Bi)] if monitoring is not implemented
(5)
Timing. The timing of the model is as follows:
1. At t = −2 the bank decides whether to monitor or not and selects loan and
deposit rates; simultaneously, the borrowers set the bond rate.
2. At t = −1 the households allocate savings.










4Costs of retail banking are assumed to be zero, so that cost of deposits for the bank is given by
D. Moreover, we neglect the possibility of the bank to monitoring only a fraction of the projects it
ﬁnances.
63. At t = 0 the borrowers obtain funds either from the households or from the
bank and invest: the choice of the project is made between 0 and 1 and is not
veriﬁable by the lenders. The borrowers have no time preference.
4. At t = 1 returns of project accrue, the borrowers repay bonds and loans and
the bank repays deposits.
In the next section we deﬁne the game between bank and borrowers and we study
how the Nash equilibrium of the game varies with the parameter B.
3 Equilibria with Weak and Severe Moral Hazard
The bank decides whether to monitor and chooses R and D in order to maximize
(2) for any F chosen by the borrowers. The borrowers choose F to maximize (3)
for any choice of the bank. The game between bank and borrowers is analysed by
restricting the attention to pure strategy equilibria. The set of players is {Ba,Bo},
where Ba is the bank and Bo are the borrowers. Before deﬁning the set of actions
of the bank, notice that the borrowers’ choice of the project depends on R if they
are ﬁnanced by the bank. When the bank decides to monitor, Ui
c (R) is the ex post
proﬁt of the borrowers under bank ﬁnance. If R = R∗
c, where R∗
c = A − b
ps−pr is
the solution to Us
c (R) = Ur
c (R), then the borrowers are indiﬀerent between the two
projects, in which case they are assumed to choose project s. If R > R∗
c, the increase
in expected repayment pi (R − R∗
c) is lower if project r is chosen, for pr < ps. For
the same reasoning, if R < R∗
c, the decrease in expected repayment pi (R∗
c − R)
is higher if project s is chosen. It follows that the borrowers choose project r for
R > R∗
c, while project s is chosen for R ≤ R∗
c. The maximum repayment the bank
can set and still induces investment in the project r is ˆ Rc = A. When the bank
decides not to monitor, cut-oﬀ values are R∗




0 (R) = Ur
0 (R), and ˆ R0 = A. By comparing bank ﬁnance with and without
monitoring, one can verify that R∗
c > R∗
0. This stems from the fact that monitoring
reduces private beneﬁts to the borrowers, who are thereby more oriented towards
project s. Since (2) is linearly increasing in R, the bank sets it as high as possible
in equilibrium by anticipating the above eﬀects on borrowers’ incentives. We then














7On the contrary, the borrowers’ choice of the project depends on F if they receive
money from the households. The ex post proﬁt of the borrowers under bond ﬁnance
is Ui (F). If F = F∗, where F∗ = A − B
ps−pr is solution to Us (F) = Ur (F), then
the borrowers choose project r for F > F∗ and project s for F ≤ F∗. Again, the
maximum repayment which induces investment is ˆ F = A, for which the borrowers
select the project r. The set of actions of the borrowers is ABo = F ∈ [0,+∞).
The timing of the game is simultaneous: the bank selects a strategy from the
set ABa and the borrowers select a strategy from the set ABo. In Proposition 1 we
compute the best response of the bank. Formal proofs of this and all other results
are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The best response of the bank is as follows: for any F the bank
decides to monitor the borrowers and to set R∗
c = A − b
ps−pr that induces them to
choose the eﬃcient project. Moreover,
D(F) =

     
     
psF for any F ≤ D∗
ps
D∗ for any D∗
ps < F ≤ F∗
prF for any F∗ < F ≤ D∗
pr
D∗ for any D∗






Proposition 2 deﬁnes the reaction function of the borrowers.




s (D) for any D ≤ Ds
F∗







ps , Ds =
ps(F∗)2
R∗
c is such that F∗




pr , ζ = prA −
ps
ps−prb and Dr =
(prA)2
B+ζ is such that F∗
r (Dr) = A.
We then analyze how the Nash equilibrium changes with the parameter B, which
indicates private beneﬁts. The borrowers must repay only when the project succeeds
because they have limited liability. Moreover, they obtain private beneﬁts from the
project r, hence they prefer it for high values of the borrowing rate. Lenders do not
obtain any repayment in the case of failure, hence they prefer the project s. The bank
sets R = R∗
c, which induces the borrowers to choose the eﬃcient project. In contrast,
a conﬂict of interests between households and borrowers arises for high values of the
8bond rate and such a conﬂict is increasing in the amount of private beneﬁts. Let
B0 = (ps − pr)[A − F∗
s (D∗)] and recall B =
ps
ps−prb and B = (ps − pr)A − c, both
derived by Assumption 1.
Deﬁnition 1 When B ≤ B ≤ B0 private beneﬁts are low and the moral hazard
problem is weak. When B0 < B < B private beneﬁts are high and the moral
hazard problem is severe.
Proposition 3 When the moral hazard problem is weak the Nash equilibrium is
(monitoring,R∗
c,D∗,F∗
s (D∗)), for which the borrowers select the eﬃcient project
under bond ﬁnance. When the moral hazard problem is severe the Nash equilibrium is
(monitoring,R∗
c,D∗,F∗
r (D∗)), for which the borrowers select the ineﬃcient project
under bond ﬁnance.
The borrowers face the following trade-oﬀ under bond ﬁnance: if they set a low
repayment their stake in the project is high, hence they choose the high eﬀort with
the aim of increasing the probability of success, but they give up private beneﬁts.
When private beneﬁts are little the borrowers decide to give up them. In contrast,
when they are large the borrowers set a high repayment, thereby choosing the in-
eﬃcient project. We denominate the equilibria described in Proposition 3 as the
market equilibria.
4 Eﬃciency of Equilibria and Monetary Policies
When information is symmetric, i.e., the choice of the project is veriﬁed by the
lenders, p is contractable hence no monitoring occurs. The bank sets pi, R and D
to maximize (2) for any choice of the borrowers. The borrowers choose pi and F to
maximize (3) for any choice of the latter. The market equilibrium with symmetric
information is such that the eﬃcient project is chosen by both bank and borrowers,
R = A, D =
psA
2 and F = A √
2. By substituting these values into (5) one gets
W∗ = npsA, (9)
which we refer to as the eﬃcient level of welfare.
We consider monetary authorities who act directly on the bond rate with the
aim of maximizing welfare given the informational constraints. In our model an
increase (decrease) of the bond rate is equivalent to a monetary tightening (expan-
sion). Authorities intervene by undoing the borrowers’ equilibrium choice before
9the households allocate savings, i.e., between t = −2 and t = −1. Recall that with
asymmetric information the bank decides to monitor and to induce the borrowers




n[λ(D,F)(psA − c) + (1 − λ(D,F))(piA + Bi)]. (10)
The solution to (10) is F = F∗, for which the best response of the bank is D = D∗
and λ∗
s = λ(D∗,F∗) is minimum provided that the borrowers keep on choosing high
eﬀort under bond ﬁnance: the new equilibrium is (monitoring,R∗
c,D∗,F∗). We
refer to the resulting level of welfare
W∗ = n[psA − λ∗
sc] (11)
as the constrained eﬃcient level.
Proposition 4 The market equilibrium levels of welfare are below the constrained
eﬃcient level. The ineﬃciency is eliminated by a monetary tightening when the moral
hazard problem is weak and by a monetary expansion when the moral hazard problem
is severe. Moreover, the resulting equilibrium represents a Pareto improvement with
compensation with respect to the market equilibria.
Monitoring is wasteful with low private beneﬁts because the borrowers select the
eﬃcient project even if they are not monitored. It follows that from the eﬃciency
point of view bonds are superior than loans as a mode of ﬁnancing because they save
on monitoring costs. Authorities then decides to implement a monetary restriction
which reduces the availability of loans.
Monitoring is useful with high private beneﬁts because the borrowers select the
ineﬃcient project if they are not monitored. Nevertheless, monitoring is costly.
Therefore authorities decide to implement a monetary expansion which decreases
the bond rate and induces the borrowers to select the eﬃcient project under bond
ﬁnance.
5 Conclusion
The model presented here tries to ﬁll a gap in the credit channel literature because
an eﬃciency issue is analysed. More precisely, we assume that the bank lending
channel is in action and we ﬁnd that direct debt is more eﬃcient than bank debt if
the moral hazard problem of ﬁnancing is weak. In such a case, a monetary tight-
ening which is addressed to reduce the supply of bank loans, is welfare enhancing.
10On the contrary, severe informational problems make monitoring useful: bank credit
becomes more eﬃcient. Nonetheless monitoring is costly and welfare is enhanced
by a monetary expansion which induces the borrowers to behave well even if they
are not monitored. We interpret the severity of the informational problem as nega-
tively related to the quality of the legal system and we deduce that the latter aﬀects
positively the quality of the pool of borrowers. We conclude that a monetary restric-
tion (expansion) is likely to be eﬀective in an economy where the legal environment
induces entrepreneurs to behave well (badly).
Further research in this area should overcome the main limitation of this analysis,
due to the diﬃculties involved in constructing a consistent model of a monetary
economy: the assumption that monetary authorities act directly on the bond rate.
6 Appendix
(Proposition 1). Consider the case in which F ≤ F∗, then the borrowers choose
project s under bond ﬁnance. If F ≤ D
ps remuneration on bonds is not higher than
remuneration on deposits, then the supply of deposits is n and bank proﬁt is equal
to
n(piR − cj − D). (A1)
Under Assumption 1, (A1) is maximum when monitoring is implemented, R is set
equal to R∗
c, so that the borrowers are induced to choose the high eﬀort, and D
equal to psF. If D
ps < F ≤ F∗, then the supply of deposits is n D
psF and bank proﬁt
can be rewritten as
n
psF
[−D2 + (piR − cj)D], (A2)
Under Assumption 1, (A2) is maximum when monitoring is implemented, R is set
equal to R∗
c and D equal to
psR∗
c−c
2 . Let D∗ =
psR∗
c−c
2 : it is worth noting that D∗
does not depend on F. It is easy to check that if F ≤ D∗
ps bank proﬁts, which are
represented by (A2) when D is set lower than psF, are increasing in D ≤ psF: the
optimal choice is setting D as high as possible, i.e., equal to psF. On the contrary,
if D∗
ps < F ≤ F∗, then (A2) for D = D∗ is higher than (A1) for D = psF.
If F∗ < F ≤ A, then the borrowers choose project r under bond ﬁnance. If
F∗ < F ≤ D
pr, then bank proﬁt is equal to (A1). If D
pr < F ≤ A, then bank proﬁt
is n
prF [−D2 + (piR − cj)D], which is maximum when monitoring is implemented,
R = R∗
c and D = D∗. The result in the text follows. As the bank decides to monitor
the borrowers and to set R = R∗
c for any F, in the next proofs we focus our attention
on the interaction between D and F.
11(Proposition 2). Consider the case in which F ≤ F∗, then remuneration on bonds
is psF. If D < psF, then the supply of deposits is n D












where B = ps (A − R∗
c) =
ps
ps−prb is the borrowers’ ex post proﬁt under bank ﬁnance.
Each borrower sets F to maximize expression (A3), which can be rewritten as follows:
Us = −psF +(psA+D)−DR∗
c (F)







−3. The ﬁrst derivative is





ps . The second derivative is strictly negative, hence
F∗





cD. On the contrary, when D ≥ psF, all borrowers are ﬁnanced by
loans and proﬁt of each one, B, does not depend on F. Note that
∂Us(F∗
s (D))
∂D ≤ 0 ⇔
D ≤ psR∗
c and Us (F∗
s (psR∗
c)) = B. It follows that the borrowers will set F∗
s (D) for
any D ≤ psR∗
c. Note that F∗
s (psR∗
c) = R∗
c > F∗. Nevertheless, we are restricting
our attention to values of F that do not exceed F∗, i.e., F∗
s (D) ≤ F∗. Solving by




Consider now the case in which F∗ < F ≤ A, hence remuneration on bonds is
prF. If D < prF, then the supply of deposits is n D




















pr , where recall that B+ζ = B+prA−
ps
ps−prb. The
corresponding value of the proﬁt is Ur (F∗
r (D)) = prA+B+D−2
￿
(B + ζ)D. When
D ≥ prF, all borrowers are ﬁnanced by loans and proﬁt of each one, B, does not de-
pend on F. Note that
∂Ur(F∗
r (D))
∂D ≤ 0 ⇔ D ≤ B + ζ and Ur (F∗
r (B + ζ)) = B.
It follows that the borrowers will set F∗
r (D) for any D ≤ B + ζ. Note that
F∗
r (B + ζ) =
B+ζ
pr > A under Assumption 1. Nevertheless, we are restricting our
attention to values of F that belong to (F∗,A]. Let D￿
r =
(prF∗)2
B+ζ be such that
F∗
r (D￿
r) = F∗ and Dr =
(prA)2
B+ζ be such that F∗
r (Dr) = A. F∗
r (D) is thus deﬁned
in (D￿
r,Dr] and recall that F∗
s (D) is deﬁned in [0,Ds]. Note that Ds ≥ D￿
r for any




c − ζ < B. If Ds < Dr, then the ranges of F∗
s (D) and
F∗
r (D) overlap in (D￿
r,Ds]. In such a case the borrowers compare Us (F∗
s (D)) to
Ur (F∗








￿2. If Dr < D, then
the result in the text follows.
12(Proposition 3). Consider the following cut-oﬀ values of B: B2 = D∗ − ζ and
B3 =
(prA)2
D∗ − ζ. Recall B0 = (ps − pr)[A − F∗
s (D∗)], for which F∗
s (D∗) = F∗ (B)












r (D) is steeper than the function F∗
s (D,B), and Dr (B) < Ds (B).
If D∗
pr < A, then B2 < B < B3. The inequality B3 > B can be rewritten as
D∗
pr < A √
2. It follows that if D∗
pr < A √
2 (< A), then max{B1,B2} < B < B < B3. In
such an interval the admissible values of B are higher than B2 and lower than B3.
Therefore, D∗
pr < F∗




r (Dr) = A. We focus on the interval D∗
pr < A √
2 for which three cases must
be taken into account: (i) B0 < B, (ii) B ≤ B0 < B, (iii) B0 ≥ B. We provide a




. Let A = 25, b = 2, c = 1.9, ps = 0.8
and pr = 0.4. We get: B = 4, B = 8.1, R∗
c = 20, D∗ = 7.05, ζ = 6, B1 = −2,
B2 = 1.05, B3 = 8.18 and B0 = 4.69. Moreover we can check that Ds < Dr < D for
any B ∈ [4,8.1) so that results of Proposition 2 hold. Note that for B ≤ B0, then
F∗
s (D∗) ≤ F∗ (B) and D∗ ≤ Ds (B). In Figure 1 we depict both the case of weak
moral hazard (when 4 ≤ B ≤ 4.69) and severe moral hazard (4.69 < B < 8.1): bold
lines represent best responses of bank and borrowers in the interval F ≤ F∗ and
grey lines in the interval F∗ < F ≤ A. Condition B ≤ B ≤ B0 is suﬃcient to state
that the Nash equilibrium is E = (F∗
s (D∗),D∗), whereas condition B0 < B < B is
suﬃcient to state that the Nash equilibrium is E￿ = (F∗
r (D∗),D∗).
(Proposition 4). The market equilibrium is deﬁned by Proposition 3: with weak
moral hazard welfare is
n[λs (psA − c) + (1 − λs)psA] = n[psA − λsc], (A5)
where λs = λ(D∗,F∗
s (D∗)) > λ∗
s.5 With severe moral hazard welfare amounts to
n[λr (psA − c) + (1 − λr)(prA + B)], (A6)
where λr = λ(D∗,F∗
r (D∗)) > λs > λ∗
s. Note that conditions λr > λs > λ∗
s and
psA − c > prA + B imply that (A6) < (A5) < (11). Therefore authorities undo
the borrowers’ equilibrium choice by increasing the bond rate from F∗
s (D∗) to F∗
when moral hazard is weak and by reducing the bond rate from F∗
r (D∗) to F∗ when
moral hazard is severe. After the restriction loss of the bank is equal to
n(λs − λ∗
s)D∗; (A7)
5When B = B0, then λs = λ
∗
s and (A5) = (11). In such a case no monetary intervention is
needed.
13the borrowers incur a total loss n[Us (F∗
s (D∗)) − Us (F∗)] which can be rewritten as
n[(1 − λs)ps (A − F∗
s ) − (1 − λ∗
s)ps (A − F∗) + (λs − λ∗
s)B]; (A8)
ﬁnally, gain of the households amounts to6
n[(1 − λ∗
s)psF∗ − (1 − λs)psF∗
s − (λs − λ∗
s)D∗]. (A9)
Notice that (A9) − [(A7) + (A8)] ≡ W∗ − n[psA − λsc] is equal to
n(λs − λ∗
s)c. (A10)
If compensations (A7) and (A8) are given to the bank and to the borrowers, respec-
tively, they are indiﬀerent between the market equilibrium and the equilibrium after
the restriction. Moreover, the households are better-oﬀ for their proﬁts increase by
the amount (A10).
After the expansion the bank incurs loss
n(λr − λ∗
s)D∗; (A11)
the borrowers incur loss n[Ur (F∗
r (D∗)) − Us (F∗)] which can be rewritten as
n[(1 − λr)(pr (A − F∗
r ) + B) − (1 − λ∗
s)ps (A − F∗) + (λr − λ∗
s)B]; (A12)
ﬁnally, gain of the households amounts to
n[(1 − λ∗
s)psF∗ − (1 − λr)prF∗
r − (λr − λ∗
s)D∗]. (A13)
Notice that (A13) > (A9) and (A13)−[(A11)+(A12)] ≡ W∗−n[psA − λrc] is equal
to
(1 − λr)[(ps − pr)A − B] + (λr − λ∗
s)c. (A14)
If compensations (A11) and (A12) are given to the borrowers and to the bank,
respectively, they are indiﬀerent between the market equilibrium and the equilibrium
after the expansion. Moreover, the households are better-oﬀ for their proﬁts increase
by the amount (A14). The result in the text follows.
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